Meditation on Emptiness
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In this major work, Jeffrey Hopkins, on e of the world's foremost scholar-practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism, offers a clear exposition of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka view of emptiness as presented in the Ge-luk-ba tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. In bringing this remarkable and complex philosophy to life, he describes the meditational practices by which emptiness can be realized and shows throughout that, far from being merely abstract, these teachings can be vivid and utterly practical. Presented in six parts, this book is indispensable for those wishing to delve deeply into Buddhist thought.
not losing the object; its arising is due to the fault of having tightened the mind too much, and thus one should loosen the mode of apprehension a little. If that does not help and one is still distracted, then coarser excitement has been generated. Since this is caused by a happy mind, one should not be too happy, for progress will be impeded, as was the case with Buddha's father who did not achieve the state of Stream Enterer due to being too happy at his son's success. At this point, it is
establishment of the reasons and the fact that the predicate of the thesis, the absence of inherently existent production, follows from these reasons. Still, the presence of the reasons (non-production from self and so forth) in the subject (things), the pervasion of the reasons by the predicate of the thesis (not being inherently produced), and the counter-pervasion do not have to be proved in the manner of the logicians through syllogisms. The Prasangikas' main means for generating an
which exists non-manifestly as a potential entity must be produced manifestly, but once it has been manifested, it need not be produced. Therefore, both the former and latter consequences do not follow from the reasons given. The Samkhyas cannot extricate themselves from error this way, for if a manifestation exists from the start, it need not be produced. Also, if a manifestation were reproduced, then its production would be endless. Thus, the fallacies remain. If a manifestation did not exist
suchness would have to perceive them as different since difference would be their mode of being, but it does not. Moreover, an eye consciousness would be produced by a visible form because its being generated in the image of the object is produced by the form. Also, an eye consciousness would not be produced by a visible form because its being a conscious entity is not produced from a visible form. An eye consciousness is not a different entity from its attribute of being produced in the image of
one just as the composite is only one. If the composite were inherently different from the aggregates, then it would be apprehended separately from the aggregates and would not have the character of the aggregates, but this is not so.143 The reasoning that the object imputed cannot be the basis of the imputation also refutes the view that the self is the continuum of the aggregates because then object imputed and basis of imputation would be one. Also, if the self were the composite of the