Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika

Jay L. Garfield, Rje Tsong Khapa, Geshe Ngawang Samten

Language: English

Pages: 628

ISBN: 0195147332

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub


Tsong khapa (14th-15th centuries) is arguably the most important and influential philosopher in Tibetan history. His Ocean of Reasoning is the most extensive and perhaps the deepest extant commentary on N=ag=arjuna's M=ulamadhyamakak=arik=a (Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way), and it can be argued that it is impossible to discuss N=ag=arjuna's work in an informed way without consulting it. It discusses alternative readings of the text and prior commentaries and provides a detailed exegesis, constituting a systematic presentation of Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy. Despite its central importance, however, of Tsong khapa's three most important texts, only Ocean of Reasoning has until now remained untranslated, perhaps because it is both philosophically and linguistically challenging, demanding a rare combination of abilities on the part of a translator. Jay L. Garfield and Geshe Ngawang Samten bring the requisite skills to this difficult task, combining between them expertise in Western and Indian philosophy, and fluency in Tibetan, Sanskrit, and English. The resulting translation of this important text is not only a landmark contribution to the scholarship of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, but will be invaluable to students of Tibetan Buddhism and philosophy, who will now be able to read this work alongside N=ag=arjuna's masterpiece.

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refutation make sense, the idea that in this system one cannot establish one’s own position is dismissed. S´u¯nyata¯saptati is composed in response to an argument against the statement in the seventh chapter of Mu¯lamadhyamakaka¯rika¯: Like a dream, like an illusion, Like a city of Gandharvas, So have arising, enduring And ceasing been explained. [VII: 34] Hence, that text is a supplement to the treatise. It is argued by some that the refutation of the essence of arising, endurance, and

going is the referent of the verb phrase then the phrase “the goer” is meaningless, there is a big difference between these. Now, suppose one thought that one does not go by performing the action in virtue of which one is a goer. Rather, there is a second action in virtue of which one goes. 23. The going in virtue of which a goer is manifest Cannot be different from the going in virtue of which he goes, Since in one goer A twofold going is untenable. A second action, different from the action of

with water, heat with fire, and fragrance with jasmine, when these are conjoined with them, such things as humidity are observed in such things as soil, water, and cloth. [117] Similarly, if seeing existed inherently, first the eye would be observed, and form would only be observed thereafter. But since this is not found to be the case, vision could not see even form.1 [175a]. Buddhapa¯lita then quotes the Catuhfi s´ataka: If the natures of all things First appear in themselves, Then why then do

that similarity would not be dependent on a cause. Thus, if they were partly similar, they should be completely similar. As it says in Na¯ga¯rjuna’s Loka¯tı¯tastava, Since the elements are not perceived by the eye How could that to which they give rise be perceived by the eye? When form is explained in this way, Your grasping of form is undone.4 [5] 2. This is a slight paraphrase of the Buddhapa¯lita, but with no change of sense. 3. It is important to bear in mind that in a standard Buddhist

been explained many times that with respect to simultaneous, inherently existent phenomena, dependence does not make sense. Therefore, since inherently existent characteristic and characterized would be unrelated, it makes no sense for the characteristic to be a sufficient reason. This also means that if something existed inherently, then since it would have to exist through its own power and it would have to be an entity that stands on its own, it does not make sense for it to be related to

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